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Say H. Goo* and Rolf H. Weber"
Many Hong Kong companies, including listed companies, are controlled by a small
group of shareholders with family ties. The inadequacy of the law has made it possible
for controlling shareholders to expropriate corporate assets by using complex corporate
structures to the detriment of minority shareholders. This article analyses the
inadequacy of the law on the appointment of directors, self-dealing and shareholder
legal remedies, and the current proposals for legislative reform. Drawing on the
experience of some Western European countries where dominant shareholding is
also a strong feature, it argues that such problems can be overcome by having a
system of law and regulation which provides adequate shareholder protection and
effective enforcement of such law.
Introduction
Many listed companies in Hong Kong are controlled by a small group of con-
trolling shareholders who often have close family ties with each other.I This
feature prevails in many Asian economies,2 with the exception of Japan,'
and has been identified as a possible key contributing factor to the Asian
financial crisis. However, this feature is not unique to Asia. Family-controlled
groups are also prevalent in Continental Europe, yet Continental Europe
appears to have dealt with the risks posed by "crony capitalism" more success-
fully than has Asia.
What seems to distinguish the family domination of Asian corporations
from that in Continental European corporations is the ease with which the
controlling shareholders may "expropriate" corporate assets to the detriment
of minority shareholders through pyramid structures or privatisation. The
controlling shareholders through a private holding company can sit at the
apex, and the listed companies at the base of the pyramid can be used as
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stalking horses for cash. The amounts raised are passed up the pyramid
through related party contracts or transactions. Other less profitable or de-
sired assets are passed down the pyramid to the listed companies.I Other
examples of expropriation involve simple disposal of the most valuable com-
pany business or assets to a company owned by the controlling shareholders,
or privatisation.5 Limiting expropriation by controlling shareholders, rather
than restricting empire building by unaccountable managers, is therefore the
primary agency issue for large corporations in East Asia.6
The risk of expropriation may lead to large social costs, as profitable
investment opportunities are foregone for lack of equity financing.' Thus,
measures should be taken to reduce such a risk. The degree to which certain
ownership structures are associated with expropriation depends on country-
specific circumstances which may include the quality of banking systems, the
legal and judicial protection of individual shareholders and the degree of
financial disclosure required.'
Focusing on the situation in Hong Kong, this article argues that the cur-
rent law is inadequate to address the dominant shareholding problems and
that the proposals for reform in the consultation paper published by the Stand-
ing Committee on Company Law Reform (SCCLR) are long overdue. It
further argues that the experience in Continental Europe demonstrates that
these problems can be overcome if the system of law and regulation provides
adequate shareholder protection and effective enforcement of such law. The
article analyses Hong Kong's existing and proposed future legal rules in light
of the experiences of several Continental European countries.
The Three Issues
Many listed companies in Hong Kong started life as small family owned
businesses. When they became successful, many of these businesses were
publicly listed by floating 25 per cent or more of the company shares. This
allowed the companies to raise funds from the stock market to finance fur-
ther expansion or for other purposes. Following the public float, the founders,
who retain a major stake as controlling shareholders, often continue to treat
4 Ibid. See also Michael Backman, Asian Eclipse: Exposing the Dark Side of Business in Asia (Singapore:
John Wiley & Sons, 2001), pp 83-86.
5 For example, in Apr 2002, Boto International Holdings Ltd, one of the territory's many publicly
traded but family-controlled companies, announced plans to sell its manufacturing operations to an
entity co-owned by Boto's own chairman, Michael Kao Cheung-chong, and by the Carlyle Group, a
US$13 billion US private investment firm: see http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/
0,13673,501020527-238668,00.html. This plan was modified later due to strong opposition from
minority shareholders: see http://www.webb-site.com/articles/botodeal2.htm.
6 See Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (n 2 above), p 2.
7 Ibid., p 29.
8 Ibid.
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the companies as their own private property, and the investing public who
are the minority shareholders are seen as mere providers of funds, not
as shareholders or co-owners to be treated equally. As a result of their
dominance, the controlling shareholders are able to appoint themselves or
their nominees as directors of the listed companies. Through their control
over the management and ultimately the general meeting, they are able to
exercise executive power in a manner which is beneficial to themselves.
While operating in a manner beneficial to the controllers' private interest
is often in the broader interests of the company and its shareholders, this is
not always the case. This is because the controllers can move the company
assets around within a group structure or privatise the company as they see fit,
even if this means the minority shareholders will lose out in sharing in the
success of the company. Often there is very little that minority shareholders
can do to stop these activities, either at the general meeting or by way of
legal action. This is partly due to the fact that our current law and regulation
favour majority shareholders too much. In particular, three areas of concern
need to be addressed: the appointment of directors; self-dealing or related
party transactions; and shareholder legal remedies.
1 Appointment of Directors
(a) The current position
Shareholders are entitled to nominate directors, but often the articles of asso-
ciation do not allow enough time for nominations to be made. Nominations
must be made within 21 days of the meeting at which the nominations will be
voted.9 However, in the case of a listed company, the Listing Rules require
that the minimum period during which notice to the issuer of the intention
to propose a person for election as a director, and during which notice to the
issuer by such person of his willingness to be elected may be given, will be at
least seven days,'o but that the latest date for lodgement of the notices must
be not more than seven days prior to the date of the meeting appointed for
such election." Shareholders who make nominations often have to bear the
costs of circulating details of nominees to other shareholders." Thus, in
practice, the management has significant control over the nomination process.
As the management of many companies is in the hands of the controlling
shareholders, the controlling shareholders have ultimate control over the
nomination and appointment of directors."
9 Companies Ordinance (Cap 32), First Sch, Table A, Art 95.
10 Listing Rules, App 3, para 4(4).
11 Ibid., para 4(5).
12 Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, Corporate Governance Review: A Consultation Paper
on Proposals Made in Phase I of the Review (July 2001) (hereinafter SCCLR Consultation Paper), para
10.16(b).
'3 [bid., para 10.11.
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Furthermore, although the directors are appointed by shareholders at the
general meeting, the controlling shareholders can and do exercise their power
in voting for themselves, their nominees or preferred candidates as directors.
(b) Proposals for reform
To overcome the problems in the nomination process, the SCCLR proposes,
inter alia, that there should be a statutory requirement for the biography of a
nominee to be given to shareholders in sufficient time and for the existing
period for making nominations to be extended.14 Most corporation laws in
Continental Europe provide (equally for listed and non-listed companies) for
a longer period of at least 15 days for nomination."
The SCCLR also recommends that companies should be encouraged to
adopt cumulative voting procedures,"b by which the shareholders can accu-
mulate their votes for each nominee and vote them all for one nominee. This
type of voting would give minority shareholders better chances of voting for
their preferred candidates. Similar rules exist in a number of Continental
European countries. For example, Spain" has rules which protect minority
shareholders through the use of proportional voting rights (which are a type
of cumulative voting that favours minority shareholders) and in Switzerland
shareholders in each share class have a right to appoint a director without the
interference of other share classes.
The SCCLR's proposals are supported by the authors because giving share-
holders rights to have a real opportunity to nominate their candidates and to
vote them in by cumulative voting is one possible way to strengthen the power
of minority shareholders. Of course, there is nothing to prevent the majority
shareholders from using the cumulative procedure to outvote the minority on
a particular candidate, but it does give the minority extra room to manoeuvre.
One argument against cumulative voting is that it could create opposition
within the board which may not be in the best interest of the company.
However, some constructive opposition in the board can be very healthy.
2 Related Party Transactions
The main problem for minority shareholders is expropriation or privatisation
by the controlling shareholders through related party transactions. While in
the case of listed companies there are many rather complicated provisions in
1 Ibid., para 10.29(a)-(b).
15 For example, n Germany at least one month: s 123, Aktiengesetz; in Switzerland at least 20
days: Art 700 of the Swiss Code of Obligations; and in France at least 15 days: Art 126 of D~cret
no 67-236 of 23 Mar 1967.
16 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), para 10.27.
17 P. V. Kunz, Der Minderheitenschutz im schweizerischen Aktienrecht (Bern: Staempfli, 2001), s 17,
n 169.
IS The Swiss Code of Obligations, Art 709 al 1.
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the Listing Rules for such transactions, there are gaps in the regulations which
make it possible for these sorts of transactions to take place.
(a) Existing law and regulations
At common law, any contract with the company needs board approval. As
fiduciaries, directors must not place themselves in a situation where their
personal interests conflict with the interests of the company. Thus, as a gen-
eral rule, controlling shareholders who are also directors must not approve a
contract in which they are interested.'I
As this strict rule can work against the company's interest in a genuine
contract, in equity, directors who have approved a contract in which they
have an interest can be relieved of the breach of their fiduciary duties by the
shareholders in a general meeting after full disclosure." However, sharehold-
ers do not owe any fiduciary duty to each other; they are perfectly entitled to
put their personal interests before those of the company when they vote at
the general meeting." Consequently, the controlling shareholders / directors
may, as shareholders, vote at the general meeting to approve the contract or
ratify the breach." Although doubts have been raised as to whether inter-
ested shareholders can actually vote," the position in case law has never
been authoritatively clarified.
Section 162 of the Companies Ordinance attempts to resolve the problem
of conflict of interest by requiring any director of a company who is in any
way, directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with
the company, if his interest in such contract or proposed contract is material,
to declare the nature of his interest at the earliest meeting of the directors at
which it is practicable for him to do so, notwithstanding that the question of
entering into the contract is not taken into consideration at that meeting. 25
The intention is that with full disclosure of interests, the board of directors
can make an informed decision as to whether to approve the contract.
There are a number of problems with section 162. First, a director may sat-
isfy the disclosure requirement of section 162 by giving a general notice at his
first board meeting declaring his interest in a list of companies well in advance
of any proposed related party transaction with any of those companies. 6 Once
'9 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378.
20 Ibid.
21 Northwest Transportation Co. Ltd v Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 589.
22 Regal (Hastings) Ltd (n 19 above).
23 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554, PC.
24 For the controversy surrounding Cook v Deeks (n 23 above) and Regal (Hastings) Ltd (n 19 above),
see L. Sealy, "Problem of Standing, Pleading and Proof in Corporate Litigation", in B. G. Pettet
(ed), Company Law in Change (London: Stevens, 1987), p 14.
25 Companies Ordinance, s 162(1).
26 Ibid., s 162(2).
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a general notice has been given, it is not necessary for the director to disclose
his interest in a specific transaction later. Such an advance general disclosure
which does not relate to any specific transaction is often promptly forgotten
when a related party transaction is later considered by the board. Even if a
director has not given a general notice, he can disclose his interest at the earli-
est meeting where it is practicable to do so;" he does not have to disclose his
interest to the meeting at which the contract is considered. This does not give
the board a real opportunity to consider whether the contract is genuinely in
the best interest of the company. Therefore, section 162 should be amended
along the lines of section 317 of the UK Companies Act 1985 which requires
the disclosure to be made at the meeting at which the question of entering into
the contract is considered; if he is not interested at the time, the disclosure
should be made at the first meeting after he becomes interested.
Second, after full disclosure, interested directors can often vote to approve
the contract. Although Article 86 of Table A says that interested directors
cannot vote on such a contract, this provision can be and often is altered.
This rule allows the directors to exercise their influence by voting despite the
conflict of interest. And in the case where the directors have control over the
board, the rule does not really protect shareholders. This is fortunately not
the case in a listed company as the Listing Rules provide that the articles of
association of a listed company must have a general prohibition against an
interested director voting.2 8 However, it does not prevent a director from
voting if his associates are the ones interested in the contract.29
In a number of Continental European countries, a director" with such a
conflict of interest may neither deliberate nor vote with the company board
on such a transaction. If a decision is taken by directors that unjustifiably
gives rise to a direct or indirect conflict of interest of an economic nature, the
directors are jointly and severally liable for all damages to the company."
Under the Swiss Code of Best Practice," adopted in autumn 2001 and re-
leased in March 2002, each member of the Board of Directors and Executive
Board should arrange his personal and business affairs so as to avoid conflicts
27 Ibid., s 162(1).
28 Listing Rules, App 3, para 4(1).
29 See Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, Consultation Paper on Proposed Amendments to the
Listing Rules Relating to Corporate Governance Issues (Jan 2002) (hereinafter HKEx Consultation
Paper), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/, Part C, para 13.2.
30 That is, a member of the supervisory board.
31 For Germany see s 181 of the Civil Code; for Switzerland see R. H. Weber, Juriscische Personen
(Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1998), pp 180-181; for Belgium see S. De Schrijver and M. Wellinger,
"Belgium", in J. Maitland-Waller (ed), The Guide to European Company Laws (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1997), pp 55-87.
32 Available at http://www.economiesuisse.ch/d/downloads/swisscodeofbestpractice-english.pdf.
The Code does not have binding legal effect since it is a form of self-regulation by an association of
market participants. However, the Code has a "soft law" character.
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of interest with the company. In case a conflict of interest arises, the member
of the Board of Directors or Executive Board concerned should inform the
Chairman of the Board. The Chairman, or Vice-Chairman, should then re-
quest an appropriate decision by the Board of Directors on the matter
depending on the degree of the conflict of interest. Such a decision must be
taken in abstention of the person concerned. Anyone who has a conflict of
interest, or who represents such a person, must abstain from decision-making
at the board. Anyone with permanent conflicts of interest must not be a
member of the Board of Directors or Executive Board.
Third, section 162 only covers contracts. This leaves open the possibility
of directors entering into "transactions or arrangements" which are short of
contracts in their technical sense and that do not comply with section 162.
Of course, such transactions or arrangements may still be caught by the some-
what ill-defined common law explained above.
Fourth, section 162 only applies to a contract between the company and
the director, and not to a contract between the company and connected per-
sons (such as the controlling shareholders who are not directors). This is a
loophole which allows directors and connected parties to escape the reach of
section 162. The directors appointed by the controlling shareholders can
approve, in accordance with the controlling shareholders' wishes, the trans-
action in which the controlling shareholders are interested without breaching
their fiduciary obligations and section 162. In Continental Europe, this is not
allowed. For example, under the Swiss Code of Best Practice, transactions
between the company and members of the company, or related persons, can
only be carried out subject to the principle of arm's length dealing and be
approved in abstention of the party concerned. If necessary, a neutral opin-
ion from an independent director or expert should be obtained and used as an
interpretation guideline for their own decision.
Fifth, section 162 does not prejudice the operation of any rule of law re-
stricting directors of a company from having any interest in contracting with
the company." Thus, even when a contract has been approved by the board
after full disclosure, it can still technically amount to a breach of the director's
fiduciary obligations and need to be ratified, if ratifiable, 4 by the sharehold-
ers in the general meeting. Ratification is not a problem for the controlling
shareholders, however, as they will control the necessary votes.
Related party transactions in listed companies are basically regulated in
three ways under the Listing Rules, depending on whether the transaction
involves: (a) a very substantial acquisition and major transaction; (b) a
discloseable transaction and share transaction; or (c) a connected transaction.
3 Companies Ordinance, s 162(5).
3 For example, following Regal (Hastings) Ltd (n 19 above). But see Cook v Deeks (n 23 above).
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A very substantial acquisition is any acquisition by a listed company or its
subsidiaries of another business, assets, company or companies, substantially
all of which are not listed, and:
1 the value of the assets acquired represents 100 per cent or more of the
assets or consolidated assets of the acquiring group; or
2 the net profit attributable to the assets being acquired as disclosed in
the latest published audited accounts represents 100 per cent or more
of such net profit of the acquiring group; or
3 the aggregate value of the consideration given represents 100 per cent
or more of the assets or consolidated assets of the acquiring group; or
4 the value of the equity capital issued as consideration given represents
100 per cent or more of the value of equity capital previously in issue;
or
5 would result in a change in control through the introduction of a ma-
jority holder or group of holders."
A major transaction is any acquisition or realisation of assets (including
securities) by a listed company or any of its subsidiaries where the bases set
out in the rule relating to a very substantial acquisition mentioned above are
50 per cent or more."
Although a very substantial acquisition or a major transaction can only be
made upon approval by the shareholders in a general meeting or with the
written approval of a shareholder or shareholders who hold more than 50 per
cent in nominal value of the shares giving the right to attend and vote at
such a general meeting, there are a number of gaps in the rules. This is the
case even when a shareholder who has a material interest in the transaction
is not allowed to vote at such a meeting or whose written approval is not
accepted." First, transactions which fall below the bases set out in the rule
are obviously not covered by the rule. This means that many transactions
which fall below the 50 per cent base do not need to be approved by disinter-
ested shareholders; they are merely regulated as discloseable or share
transactions as explained below.
Secondly, material interest is not defined in the listing rules. The way in which
the Exchange interprets the term has recently attracted some criticism.38 In
a revised proposed sale by Boto International Holdings Ltd of its core artificial
3 Listing Rules, r 14.06.
36 Ibid., r 14.09.
Ibid., rr 14.07(1) and 14.10.
38 See Samuel Yeung, "Boto Sale Ignores Advice", SCMP, 20 Aug 2002, Business, p 1; Samuel Yeung,
"Santa Gift-Wraps Tree Maker", SCMP, 20 Aug 2002, Business 2, p 2; Samuel Yeung, "HKEx Re-
plies on Boto Vote Give Rise to More Questions", SCMP, 30 Aug 2002, Business 2, p 12; Samuel
Yeung, "HKEx gives Boto Director Vote on Sale", SCMP, 11 June 2002, Business, p 3.
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Christmas tree business to Greenland Investment Holdings Ltd (GlHL) (a buy-
out vehicle owned 75 per cent by Carlyle and 25 per cent by Boto), the Exchange
allowed three shareholders of Boto, who apparently had a conflict of interest in
the proposed sale, to vote. The three shareholders were executive director Liliana
Tsen Yun-lei, senior manager Philip Kao and HSBC International Trustee which
held Boto shares on behalf of a family trust of a deceased co-founder. The Ex-
change obviously thought that each of the three parties did not have a material
interest in the proposed sale: it said that it would be wrong to disallow Liliana
Tsen from voting simply because she was an employee of the company, or Philip
Kao just because he was a nephew of the chairman; and as for the trust's
beneficiaries, they were independent because they were no longer involved in
Boto's operation. Critics argue that the three parties should not have been al-
lowed to vote because they each had a potential conflict of interest: Tsen was a
member of the board that proposed the deal; Kao was a nephew of the chairman
who would still sit on the board of the acquiring company and would receive
substantial fees (under the deal, Boto would sign a three-year consultancy agree-
ment by which the services of certain directors of Boto, including its chairman,
Michael Kao, would be provided to GIHL in return for fees of HK$11.2 million
per year plus a discretionary fee based on GIHI's financial performance); and
HSBC International Trustee was providing financing for about 80 per cent of the
purchase price of the deal." The deal was approved by "independent sharehold-
ers" including the three parties by a narrow margin of 52.74 per cent.
Thirdly, a point related to Philip Kao's position in the Boto / GIHL deal,
the rule does not prevent an associate of the interested controlling share-
holder or of a director from voting. Technically, it may be possible to argue
that Philip Kao did not have a material interest in the proposed deal if he did
not personally stand to gain from it despite his family relationship with Michael
Kao. However, as a close relative, and thus an associate, he would not have
been allowed to vote had the transaction been a connected transaction, as
will be seen below. One wonders whether the distinction between a major
transaction and a connected transaction in relation to voting by an associate
is justifiable.
A discloseable transaction is any acquisition or realisation of assets
(including securities) where the bases are 15 per cent or more and includes
both very substantial acquisition and major transactions.40 A share transac-
tion is any acquisition of assets (including securities but excluding cash) where
the bases are less than 15 per cent but the consideration includes securities
for which listing will be sought." Neither a discloseable transaction nor a
l Ibid.
40 Listing Rules, r 14.12(1).
41 Ibid., r 14.20.
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share transaction requires disinterested shareholder approval. But as soon as
the terms of the transaction have been agreed the listed company must in-
form the Exchange and deliver to it a draft notice containing certain prescribed
information, including the details of the transaction.42
A connected transaction is: (a) a transaction between a listed company
(or its subsidiaries) and a connected person; or (b) an acquisition or
realisation by the listed company (or its subsidiaries) of an interest in a com-
pany whose substantial shareholder is or is proposed to be a director, chief
executive or controlling shareholder of the listed acquiring or realising com-
pany (or its subsidiaries) or their associates."4 Boto's initial proposed sale to a
company owned 70 per cent by Carlyle and 30 per cent by Michael Kao would
have fallen into category (a).
Connected transactions are generally to be made conditional on approval
by the shareholders in the general meeting and that any connected person
interested in the transaction must abstain from voting at the meeting." The
requirement is slightly stricter than that for a major transaction in that an
42 Ibid., rr 14.13(1) and 14.21.
43 A connected person means a director, chief executive or substantial shareholder of the listed com-
pany or any of its subsidiaries or an associate of any of them (ibid., r 1.01) and includes: (a) any
person or company with whom they have entered, or proposed to enter, into an agreement,
arrangement, understanding or undertaking, whether formal or informal and whether express or
implied, with respect to the transaction; and (b) any person cohabiting with them as a spouse; or (c)
any of their relatives, including: (i) a child or step-child aged 18 or over; (ii) a parent or step-parent;
(iii) a brother, sister, step-brother or step-sister; or (iv) a mother-in-law, father-in-law, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, brother-in-law or sister-in-law (ibid., r 14.03(2)).
44 Ibid., r 14.23(1). Associate means: (a) in relation to any director, chief executive or substantial
shareholder (being an individual): (i) his spouse and any of his (or his spouse's) children or step-
children under the age of 18 years (ie family interest); (ii) the trustees, acting in their capacity as
such trustees, of any trust of which he or any of his family interests is a beneficiary or, in the case of
a discretionary trust, is a discretionary object; and (iii) any company in the equity capital of which
he and / or his family interests taken together are directly or indirectly interested so as to exercise or
control the exercise of 30% (or such lower amount as may from time to time be specified in the
Takeover Code as being the level for triggering a mandatory general offer) or more of the voting
power at general meetings, or to control the composition of a majority of the board of directors and
any other company which is its subsidiary or holding company or a fellow subsidiary of any such
holding company; and (b) in relation to a substantial shareholder (being a company) means any
other company which is its subsidiary or holding company or is a fellow subsidiary of any such
holding company or one in the equity capital of which it and / or such other company or companies
taken together are directly or indirectly interested so as to exercise or control the exercise of 30% (or
such lower amount as may from time to time be specified in the Takeover Code as being the level for
triggering a mandatory general offer) or more of the voting power at general meetings, or to control
the composition of a majority of the board of directors (ibid., rr 1.01). Note, however, that in the
case of a connected transaction falling within r 14.23(1)(a) only, a company is not an "associate" of
a director, chief executive or substantial shareholder of a listed issuer by virtue only of the director's,
chief executive's or substantial shareholder's indirect interest in that company through his interest
in the listed issuer, and in the case of a connected transaction falling within r 14.23(1)(b) only, the
listed acquiring or realising issuer is not an "associate" of the director, chief executive or controlling
shareholder, when the listed acquiring or realising issuer is acquiring or realising an interest in a
company in which it is already a substantial shareholder and a director, chief executive or control-
ling shareholder shall not be taken to be a "substantial shareholder" in a company by virtue only of
the director's, chief executive's or controlling shareholder's indirect interest in that company through
his interest in the listed issuer (ibid., r 14.03(3), (4)).
4 Ibid., r 14.26.
HeinOnline -- 33 Hong Kong L.J. 80 2003
associate, being a connected person, cannot vote to approve the transaction.
However, one major gap in the existing regulation is that the rule does not
apply to a transaction between the director (or connected person) of a listed
company and an associated company of the listed company, that is a com-
pany which is less than 51 per cent owned by the listed company. Thus, it is
possible for directors or controlling shareholders to use a pyramid structure to
transact with a company in which the listed company holds less than 51 per
cent of the shares (an associated company, not a subsidiary) without the ap-
proval of the listed company's shareholders unless the transaction is a major
transaction where the requirement of shareholder approval is less stringent, 6
for example selling unprofitable assets to an associated company at inflated
prices or acquiring profitable assets from an associated company under-value.
Neither does the rule apply to a transaction between a listed company and its
associated company. As mentioned, Boto's original deal would have been
regarded as a connected transaction and all connected persons, including Philip
Kao, would have been barred from voting to approve the deal. However, the
deal was later revised so that Michael Kao would not be an owner of the
acquiring company but that Boto would retain a 25 per cent stake in it. The
deal became a proposed sale to an associated company, Boto retaining a 25
per cent stake in the acquiring company (which was not enough to be Boto's
subsidiary). The deal was therefore no longer a connected transaction.
Also, it is possible for a listed company to be granted a waiver by the
Exchange from the relevant requirements, including the requirement of dis-
interested shareholder approval. Unfortunately, the Exchange has not been
very transparent on the criteria for granting a waiver.
Apart from the Listing Rules, which apply only to listed companies, there is
no statutory provision in the Companies Ordinance requiring shareholders'
approval and the abstention of voting by interested shareholders for a related
party transaction." Of course, where the director (or connected person) enters
into a related party transaction with a non-listed company's subsidiary which is
a listed company, the transaction may be governed by the Listing Rules as dis-
cussed above. However, the gaps in the existing rules make it possible for
regulatory arbitrage to occur. As a result, some related party transactions
46 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), paras 9.02-9.04.
47 In some Continental European countries, such practices are a strong legal ground for a liability
claim against a director personally; for Austria see F Pegger, "Austria", in Maitland-Waller (n 31
above), pp 1-27. Examples of management board members' liability are where: (a) contributions
are refunded to the shareholders; (b) interests or shares in the profits are paid to the shareholders;
(c) the company purchases its own shares by subscription, takes them in pledge or by redemption;
(d) shares are issued before all the capital is paid in; (e) the company's capital is distributed; or
(f) loans are granted.
4 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), paras 3.01(executive summary) and 8.03. One exception
is in relation to the payments to directors in connection with the loss of office which requires share-
holders' approval: s 163A of the Companies Ordinance.
Vol 33 Part 1I The Expropriation Game 81
HeinOnline -- 33 Hong Kong L.J. 81 2003
82 Say H. Goo and Rolf H. Weber (2003) HKLJ
remain unfair to minority shareholders even though technically they may be in
compliance with the rules. Rule changes are needed to deal with this problem."
(b) The proposed reform
A number of proposals have been made both by the SCCLR and the Hong
Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (the HKEx) (the parent company of
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) which is the front-line regulator of
companies listed on the Exchange)o to deal with the problems identified
above.
To strengthen the statutory provisions which apply to all companies, first,
the SCCLR proposes that the scope of section 162 of the Companies Ordi-
nance be extended to include transactions and arrangements, and to cover
contracts, transactions or arrangements with "connected persons".51
Second, it proposes that an interested director should be required to make a
disclosure of his interest on an ad hoc basis, in addition to the general notice in
advance." Furthermore, a director should not be allowed to vote at a board
meeting on the contract or transaction in which he or a connected person has
an interest." The HKEx has made a similar recommendation recently in its
consultation paper" proposing that the Listing Rules be amended to extend
the prohibition against a director voting in a contract in which he is interested
to one in which his associates are interested." This recommendation is to
4 See Andrew Sheng's comments as reported in Samuel Yeung, "Sheng Changes Governance Tone",
SCMP, 24 Sept 2002, Business, p 3.
50 Under a memorandum of understanding between the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC)
and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) dated 25 Nov 1991 and replaced by an amended
memorandum of understanding dated 6 Mar 2000, the SEHK became the frontline regulator for the
companies listed on it, except the HKEx which is regulated by the SFC: available at http://www.
hkex.com.hk/. However, the HKEx Board of Directors does not exercise the functions and powers
over listing matters, but has instead delegated those functions and powers to its Listing Committee.
In practice it is the Listing Division of the Listing, Regulation and Risk Management Unit of the
HKEx that has the responsibilities for initiating any proposed changes to the Listing Rules. It usually
works closely with the Corporate Finance Division of the SFC on draft proposals which will be
considered and discussed by the Listing Committee before they are released to the public for
consultation. After such consultation, the revised proposals will be put to the Listing Committee for
formal consideration and approval, and then subsequent approval by the HKEx's Executive
Committee, the Board of Directors of the SEHK and finally the SFC. For a detailed account of the
procedure for amendments to the Listing Rules, see ch 5 of the recent Report of the Panel of Inquiry
on the Penny Stocks Incident prepared by the panel of inquiry which consisted of Messrs Robert G.
Kotewall and Gordon C. K. Kwong, published on 9 Sept 2002 (hereinafter the Penny Stocks Report),
available at http://www.info.gov.hk/info/pennystock-e.htm.
5 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), para 7.09(f).
5 [bid., para 7.09(c).
Ibid., para 7.09 (a). The SCCLR also proposes three exceptions: (a) where the directors' interest is
"immaterial" (ie one that does not give rise to a risk of actual conflict); (b) in a contract relating to
a loan to the company, where the director gives a guarantee for repayment of the loan; and (c) any
proposed employee benefit scheme which may benefit the directors provided his entitlements are no
greater than others in the same class: ibid., para 7.09(b).
5 HKEx Consultation Paper (n 29 above).
Ibid., Part C, paras 13.1-13.3.
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be welcomed, as it will hopefully reduce the likelihood of abuses by directors by
using their associates to circumvent the Listing Rules.
Third, given that there is generally no provision in the Companies Ordi-
nance to require shareholder approval and abstention from voting by interested
shareholders, and given that there are many gaps in the Listing Rules, the
SCCLR proposes that there should be a general provision in the Companies
Ordinance providing that where a contract is significant" it should be ap-
proved by disinterested shareholders in the general meeting, and interested
shareholders should not be allowed to vote." This proposal shares some of
the thinking behind the legislation in a number of Continental European
countries: for example, in Denmark" and Sweden" interested majority share-
holders are required not to vote. Other countries have introduced a loyalty
obligation for majority shareholders: for example, in Germany6 o and Aus-
tria6' shareholders must give priority to the company interests in general, not
to their own interest. The Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries sup-
ports this, with a major qualification which applies only to non-listed
companies. 62
The SCCLR further proposes that the requirements of shareholder
approval and abstention from voting by interested shareholders in the cur-
rent Listing Rules be extended to contracts between the director (or connected
person) and the company's associated company." A company will be an
associated company if the listed company holds no less than 20 per cent
of voting rights in it. This proposal would make it more difficult for the
directors / controlling shareholders to misappropriate corporate assets using
a pyramid or cross-holding structure. It appears to be a good idea. The HKEx
has made the same recommendation to regulate transactions between con-
nected persons and associated companies as connected transactions, with
a threshold of 20 per cent, arguing that this is in line with the international
5 The test for deciding whether a transaction is "significant" is left open for consultation: See n 12
above, para 8.25. The Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries (HKICS) is in favour of a net
asset test because it is more objective, and suggests that a transaction be regarded as significant if its
value is more than 20% of the company's net assets, with an exemption of HK$100,000 or less: see
HKICS's response to the SCCLR Consultation Paper (unpublished).
5 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), paras 7.09(d), 8.27, and 9.08(b). These are already pro-
vided for under the Listing Rules for listed companies as mentioned above.
58 Kunz (n 17 above), a 17, nn 68, 216.
" Ibid., s17, n 157.
60 See G. Wiesner, "Kommentierung zum Aktiengesetz", in Miunchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts,
Bd. 4 (Monchen: Beck, 2nd edn, 1999), s 17, n 16.
61 Ch Petsch, "Austria", in Association International des Jeunes Avocats (hereinafter AIJA), Protec-
tion of Minority Shareholders (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp 21, 35.
62 It thinks that this should not apply to cases where the company is nothing more than a vehicle for a
very small group of shareholders (say a husband and wife) to hold an investment or asset. This
situation is quite common in Hong Kong. If a husband and wife wish to sell to the company an
apartment which they jointly own, what are they going to do if they cannot approve the transaction
in the general meeting by their own votes? There are no other disinterested shareholders who can
approve the transaction: See HKICS's response to the SCCLR Consultation Paper (unpublished).
63 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), para 9.08(a).
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accounting standard which was adopted in Hong Kong on 1 January 2001.64
While the proposal is sound in principle, it has been argued that the thresh-
old should be 30 per cent rather than 20 per cent, because 20 per cent is not
even enough to give the shareholder of the listed company a negative control
to block a special resolution at the general meeting of its associated company
when a vote on the transaction is taken.65
These proposals are consistent with developments elsewhere in the world
and should prevent directors and controlling shareholders from abusing their
power. There is, however, no proposal to regulate a transaction between the
listed company and its associated company as a connected transaction. Thus,
cases such as the controversial sale by Boto of its artificial Christmas tree
business to GIHL, in which it would retain a 25 per cent stake, would still be
regulated as a major transaction.
(c) Other possible reforms
In addition to the above proposals, it may be appropriate to prohibit a list of
contracts which are more likely to benefit the directors than the company
because they result in debts to the company. For example, in Ireland6 6 a com-
pany is, as a general rule, prohibited from entering into the following
transactions with a director: (a) the making of loans and quasi-loans as de-
fined in the Act;67 (b) credit transactions, such as hire-purchase agreements
and leasing arrangements; and (c) the provision of guarantees or other secu-
rity for the benefit of a director.
3 Shareholders' Legal Remedies
Apart from the inadequacy of the law in respect of related party transactions,
the other major problem which is often neglected by policy and law makers
is the lack of an effective mechanism for shareholders to bring an action
against directors or controlling shareholders for wrongdoing. Obviously,
there is a need to maintain a proper balance between safeguarding the inter-
ests of the minority and preventing disgruntled shareholders from taking
pointless shareholder actions against the company to the detriment of the
company's interest. But the law and court practices do not appear to have
struck an appropriate balance. Courts in Hong Kong seem to be more re-
luctant to allow shareholder actions than courts in Continental Europe. In
64 HKEx Consultation Paper (n 29 above), Part B, paras 26.1-26.9, 30.1-30.10.
65 See HKICS's response to the SCCLR Consultation Paper (unpublished).
66 See Part III of the Irish Company Act 1990; H. Ong and S. Hegarty, "Ireland", in Maitland-Waller
(n 31 above), pp 299-319; similarly for Denmark see H. Peytz, "Denmark", in Maitland-Waller
(n 31 above), at pp 143-157. The United Kingdom also has similar provisions: see Part X of
Companies Act 1985.
67 This is already the case in Hong Kong under s 157H of the Companies Ordinance.
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many countries, protection of minority shareholders has become an impor-
tant area in the jurisprudence; particularly courts in Northern European
countries (Denmark" and Sweden)"9 as well as Germany70 and Austria" have
frequently approved liability claims of minority shareholders against directors.
In most cases, the causes of action are damages claims.
Currently, shareholders of listed companies have a number of possible
legal remedies under Hong Kong law: the common law derivative action;
the statutory remedies in connection with unfairly prejudicial conduct; and
an action for breach of personal rights. As explained below, each of these is
problematic.
(a) Derivative action
At present, there is little incentive for shareholders to take action against
directors or the management for expropriation through derivative actions
because of the technical difficulty in establishing a locus standi under the
notorious rule in Foss v Harbottle.72 An expropriation is a wrong done to
the company and an action should be brought by the company, not the
minority shareholders, unless there is a fraud on the minority (which is the
case with expropriation) and the wrongdoers are in control. Furthermore,
they are potentially liable for costs" and the exercise of discretion to award
costs is uncertain. The court may award costs if the proceedings were brought
about reasonably and in good faith.74 There is no contingency fee system in
Hong Kong, nor is legal aid available for shareholder disputes." Any dam-
ages awarded belong to the company, not to the individual shareholders
who brought the claim. 6 Thus, other shareholders are able to free-ride on
the benefit of the action. There is, therefore, an incentive not to bring any
68 See B. Gomard, Das danische Gesetziber Aktiengesellschaften (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 3rd edn, 1991),
p 5 1 .
69 See Wol1schliger, "Historical Trends in Civil Litigation in Japan, Arizona, Sweden, and Germany:
Japanese Legal Culture in the Light of Judicial Statistics", ch 3, in H. Baum (ed), Japan: Economic
Success and Legal System (Berlin: de Grayter, 1997) pp 89, 93, 113 ff; See Kunz (n 17 above), s 17,
n 154.
70 See Wiesner (n 60 above), s 18, n 4 ff.
71 Petsch (n 61 above).
72 (1843) 2 Hare 461, See SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), paras 15.03-15.13. Also, as share-
holders usually hold stock in the name of the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company (Nominees)
Ltd, they will need to establish their status as legal shareholders before they can sue, which adds
another layer of complexity.
7 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), paras 8.01(a) (executive summary), 15.14(a).
7 See Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373, CA. In Switzerland, the judge is entitled to charge
the company for the costs of procedure (including attorneys' fees) if the shareholder had an appro-
priate reason to start legal action notwithstanding its outcome (The Code of Obligations, Art 756
al 2). In Spain, the liability claim is a so-called group claim (see Kunz (n 17 above), s 17, n 170).
75 The Legislative Council has set up a working party to consider extending legal aid to shareholder
disputes: see Jane Moir, "Legal-Aid Net under Review", SCMP, 11 Mar 2002, Business, p 1.
7 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), paras 8.01(b) (executive summary), 15.14(b).
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action. In addition, it is often difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to frame
a claim."
The SCCLR's proposal is that derivative action should be governed by
statutory provisions instead of common law." The current procedure of hav-
ing a preliminary hearing to determine whether the individual shareholder
has standing to bring a derivative action should be abolished. Instead, all
existing shareholders, directors and officers, past or present, should be al-
lowed to bring a derivative action." It should no longer be necessary to show
"fraud on minority", as is currently required under common law; instead, the
grounds for such action would include fraud, negligence, default in relation
to any laws or rules, and breach of fiduciary or statutory duties.80 Where the
action involves a transaction to be approved by disinterested shareholders,
and such approval has not been obtained, the controlling shareholders who
have an interest in the transaction should have to prove that the transaction
was fair and not to the detriment of the company.8 Where the transactions
are ratifiable, only disinterested shareholders may ratify such transactions.
And the fact that a transaction has been so ratified should not be a bar to a
derivative action; it should only be one factor in determining whether the
company should receive redress.
The common law derivative actions in Hong Kong originate from the
English case law and therefore, not surprisingly, derivative actions in Hong
Kong and England face very similar problems." The English Law Commis-
sion has made a proposal for reform. The substance of its proposal is that
derivative action should be available to any member if the case falls within
the following situation, namely that if the company were the applicant, it
would be entitled to any remedy against any person as a result of any breach
or threatened breach by any director of the company of any of his duties to
the company." This is essentially similar to the SCCLR's proposed grounds
for derivative action (which would include fraud, negligence, default in rela-
tion to any laws or rules, and breach of any duty, whether fiduciary or statutory).
However, the English Law Commission proposes that the right to bring a
derivative action should be subject to tight judicial control at all stages. In
7 Ibid., paras 8.01(c) (executive summary), 15.14(c).
78 Ibid., para 15.25.
7 Ibid., paras 8.02(a) (executive summary), 15.25(a).
8o Ibid., paras 8.02(d) (executive summary), 15.26.
81 Ibid., paras 8.02(b) (executive summary), 15.25(b). In Belgium, the minority shareholders can even
ask the judge to declare such a decision null and void (see Kunz (n 17 above), s 17, n 59).
82 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), paras 8.02(c) (executive summary), 15.25(c).
81 Ibid.
84 For the problems in England see Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No 246, available
at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lib-comp.htm#liblc246 (London: Stationery Office, 1997), paras
1.4, 6.1-6.4.
85 Ibid., para 6.5.
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particular, an applicant would be required to seek leave from the court by
close of pleadings to continue the action. In considering whether to grant
leave the court would take account of all the circumstances. 6 This is where
the SCCLR's approach is different to that of the English Law Commission.
The SCCLR's proposal has the advantage of allowing a shareholder to bring
the substance of the complaint to the court for adjudication without the hurdle
of a preliminary hearing on standing. However, it is also vulnerable to abuses
by disgruntled shareholders. Thus, in this regard, the English Law Commission's
proposal puts the courts back in charge by giving the courts the flexibility to
allow cases to proceed in appropriate circumstances while giving the advisers,
shareholders and the court the necessary guidance on matters which the court
will take into account in deciding whether to grant leave."
The other main difference between the SCCLR's approach and that of
the English Law Commission is that the Law Commission suggests that pri-
mary legislation is not required and that reform should be achieved by rules of
court,88 whereas the SCCLR's proposed derivative action would be statutory.
The proposal of the SCCLR to put derivative action on a statutory footing
has the advantage of certainty, but does not give the court discretion to disal-
low any action in appropriate circumstances, as for example where there is a
technical breach of duties by the director but it would not be in the best
interest of the company for an action to be brought.
Nevertheless, the proposals of the SCCLR represent a breath of fresh air
and would modernise derivative actions and empower shareholders in terms
of seeking legal remedies for any wrong done to the company. The Govern-
ment has announced plans to introduce legislation soon to implement the
SCCLR's proposal.89
(b) Unfair prejudice
Currently, under section 168A of the Companies Ordinance, a shareholder
can petition the court for an appropriate order if the affairs of the company
have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the inter-
ests of the shareholders. The problem is that the concept of "unfair prejudice"
is not defined in the Ordinance or judicially. This appears to be deliberate,
because any definition would restrict the flexibility of such a concept. So the
court generally looks at the alleged misconduct of the wrongdoing directors
or shareholders in totality in the circumstances of each case. While it is rea-
sonable to expect that expropriation can be regarded as unfairly prejudicial,
86 Ibid., para 6.6.
87 Ibid., para 6.14.
8 Ibid.
89 Samuel Yeung, "More Muscle Sought For Minority Holders", SCMP, 29 Aug 2002, Business, p 3.
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it is tempting to put in as many allegations of misconduct as possible to
bolster the claim and chances of success. This means that the pleadings can
be very lengthy and claims can involve extensive evidence. This prolongs
hearings and increases costs.
Section 168A has not been widely used by shareholders in listed compa-
nies where there is a market for the shares. The shareholders can always take
the "Wall Street walk" (ie vote with their feet and sell their shares in the
stock market), so unless there are very exceptional circumstances, they are
unlikely to use the section. This section is usually used by shareholders in a
quasi-partnership company where there is no available market for them to
sell their shares. Furthermore, in a number of petitions involving quasi-part-
nership companies, the court has been reluctant to entertain unfair prejudice
petitions where the respondents have made an offer to buy out the petition-
ers because the petitioners are expected to take up the offer as an alternative
remedy." This may suggest that the court would be equally reluctant to en-
tertain a petition by shareholders in a listed company where there is a market
for the shareholders to exit. The SCCLR does not deal with the fundamental
question of whether shareholders in listed companies should be allowed to
use section 168A. The authors believe there is no good reason to deny share-
holders in listed companies the remedies available under section 168A. The
fact that shareholders in listed companies have a market to sell their shares
does not mean that is an adequate remedy or protection. Where there exists
major corporate malpractice (such as that witnessed recently in the United
States), a large number of shareholders will all seek to sell their shares. This
results in significant loss of value through the decline of the price of the shares,
and results in losses for all shareholders. If the shareholders can petition un-
der section 168A for a purchase order against the wrongdoers to purchase
their shares at the market price before news of corporate malpractice comes
to light, the shareholder can avoid their loss. Thus, it is proposed that section
168A be amended to make it clear that shareholders' right to petition should
not be prejudiced by the fact that they are able to sell their shares through the
stock exchange.
The SCCLR's proposal on section 168A is somewhat modest, merely say-
ing that the court should be given power to award damages and costs to
shareholders because this is not clear from the present legislation. However,
it is arguable that the court already has such power since the court is entitled
to "make such other order as it thinks fit"." Curiously, it also proposes that
90 See for example Re a Company (No 004377 of 1986) [1987] 1 WLR 102; Re a Company (No 007623
of 1984) [1986] BCLC 362.
91 Companies Ordinance, s 168A(2)(c). In Re a Company (No 005136 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 82,
Hoffmann J was of the opinion that where the petition was in substance to protect the interests of
the company, for example to restrain a transaction which was disadvantageous to the company,
then the petitioner might be entitled to indemnity for cost from the company (at p 85a-c).
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the court be given power to require controlling shareholders to buy out
minorities. This is already a common order." The SCCLR also suggests
that members of an overseas company should have a right to petition under
section 168A, because arguably section 168A does not apply to overseas
companies. This is important because a large number of companies listed in
Hong Kong are incorporated abroad.
Unfortunately, the SCCLR has not dealt with the real problems with sec-
tion 168A, which are the length of pleadings, trial and cost as mentioned
above. These problems can only be resolved by proper guidelines on judicial
case management. This is not addressed at all in the consultation paper.
Section 168A is modelled on section 459 of the UK Companies Act
1985,93 so again, the problems in England as regards section 459 are very
similar to those in Hong Kong, except in Hong Kong the legal cost is likely to
be much higher. The English Law Commission has published an impressive
report on how case management can help to reduce cost." Rather surprisingly,
this report was not referred to by the SCCLR. The Chief Justice's Working
Party is considering ways to strengthen judicial case management.95 However,
the modernisation of the derivative action may make section 168A even less
relevant to shareholders in listed companies (though obviously section 168A
would still be an important remedy for shareholders in non-listed companies).
In Continental Europe, there is no identical concept based on "unfair
prejudice". A judge does not intervene in management decisions except in
very extreme cases. Minority shareholders' protection is instead provided
through various protective provisions on shareholders' special financial rights.
For example, in Belgium the minority shareholders have a right to exercise
a put option at the charge of controlling shareholders, thereby realising an
exit.96 In France, a claim for dissolution of the company is possible; thereby,
the value of the company is distributed as dividends.91 In several countries,
92 Companies Ordinance, s 168A(2). The court usually makes an order requiring one party to buy out
the other.
93 For a detailed analysis of s 459, see S. H. Goo, Minority Shareholders' Protection: A Study of Section 459
of the Companies Act 1985 (London: Cavendish, 1994).
9 See n 84 above. For an analysis of the English proposals, see S. H. Goo, "Shareholder Remedies"
(1998) 8(5) Company Secretary 16, and Andrew Hicks and S. H. Goo, Cases & Materials on Com-
pany Law (London: Blackstone Press Ltd, 4th edn, 2001), pp 499-507.
9 See Chief Justice's Working Party on Civil Justice Reform, Civil Justice Reform: Interim Report and
Consultation Paper, available at http://www.civiljustice.gov.hk, paras 34-40, 240-256.
96 See Art 19 0 quaer in s Xl of the Belgian Company Law (Code de Commerce); Schrijver and Wellinger
(n 31 above), p 83; Kunz (n 17 above), p 1074.
97 See Art 225-246, s 7 of the French Company Law (L225-246 Code de Commerce); P. Peguet,
N. Carbiner and J-Ch. Sabourin, "France", in AIJA (n 61 above), p 81, n 35; in Switzerland, a
minority of 10% of the shareholders can lodge a dissolution action with the judge (The Code of
Obligations, Art 736, No 4).
Vol 33 Part 1 The Expropriation Game 89
HeinOnline -- 33 Hong Kong L.J. 89 2003
such as Germany," Finland," Spain"' and Sweden,"' minority sharehold-
ers are entitled to receive a minimum dividend (subject to certain conditions);
thus, the controlling shareholders cannot "starve out" the small owners. In
others, such as Luxemburg,"o2 a share without voting rights must be com-
bined with a higher dividend than a share with voting rights. In general,
European laws do not allow an expropriation of shareholders.
(c) Personal rights
Expropriation, which is a wrong to the company, cannot be regarded as a
wrong to members personally."o3 Where the wrongdoers are directors, it is
not well settled whether a member can bring a personal action against the
wrongdoing directors for breach of duties, 0 because directors owe their
duties to the company only in very limited circumstances, the precise
scope of which is not well defined. Neither can a shareholder sue the wrong-
doing directors for loss in the value of his shares, because the damage is to
the company and the shareholder's loss is only consequential to the com-
pany's damage.0o Also, where the right is conferred on him in his capacity as
an outsider, it is not clear whether he can enforce such right in a personal
action." The SCCLR proposes that it should be made clear that individual
members should have the right to enforce all rights in the memorandum
and articles in a personal action. This is now in the Companies (Amendment)
(No 2) Bill 2002 which is being considered by the Legislative Council.'
This proposal will remove the current uncertainty surrounding shareholders'
right to enforce personal rights. But until the rule that expropriation is a
wrong to the company is changed, shareholders remain unable to bring a
personal action against expropriation.
98 See Art 254, s 7 of the German Company Law (s 254 Aktiengesetz); M. Stecher, "Germany", in
AIJA (n 61 above), pp 86-94.
9 See P. Tenhunen, "Finland", in AIJA (n 61 above), pp 57-64.
10 See Art 91 of the Spanish Company Law (Ley de Sociedades Anonimas); C. Armero Montes, "Spain",
in AIJA (n 61 above), p 191, 199, n 36.
101 See H. Ramberg, "Sweden", in AIJA (n 61 above), pp 207-214.
102 See Art 44 of the Company Law of Luxembourg (Lois Luxembourgeoises sur les sociatds); T. Loesch,
"Luxembourg", in Maitland-Waller (n 31 above), pp 355-360.
103 See, for example, MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13, p 25; Edwards v Halliwell [19501 2 All ER
1064, p 1066g-h; Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204,
p 224A-D. See also Goo (n 93 above), p 10.
104 See Goo (n 93 above), ch 3, para 3.2(g). Beck ((1974) 52 Can Bar Rev 159, pp 171-172) suggested
that any breach of director's duty should give rise to a personal action.
1o5 Prudential Assurance (No 2) (n 103 above), p 223.
106 See Goo (n 93 above), p 11.
107 See clause 9 of the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2002.
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Other Associated Problems
1 Voting by Poll
Although the shareholders may vote in the general meeting for their candi-
dates to the position of directorship, the fact that the investing public is
invariably in the minority (as the minimum requirement for the public float
is only 25 per cent) means that often they do not have enough votes to succeed.
In the case of related party transactions, where interested shareholders and
connected persons are not allowed to vote, the minority shareholders may
have stronger influence over the outcome of the voting. However, it has been
suggested that the voting process in Hong Kong by show of hands favours the
controlling shareholders. Thus, although the Listing Rules require indepen-
dent shareholders' approval for certain related party transactions, voting by
show of hands renders this requirement ineffective. 10
In Hong Kong, at any general meeting a resolution put to the vote of the
meeting is usually decided on a show of hands unless a poll (before or on the
declaration of the result of the show of hands) is demanded.' Thus, it de-
pends on how many shareholders turn up at the general meeting to vote.
Apparently, in practice, what happens is that the votes of the public are nearly
always overwhelmed by the hands of employee shareholders (who are not
directors and who may have received a small number of shares as a reward for
being good employees), who receive a script and instructions from the man-
agement or controlling shareholders on how to vote." 0 As for the public,
most hold their shares in the name of the clearing company, Hong Kong
Securities Clearing Company (Nominees) Ltd (HKSCC Nominees) under
the Central Clearing and Settlements System (CCASS)."' Although it is
possible to withdraw the stock from CCASS and register it in one's own name,
this is not usually done because it is expensive, and in any case it makes
scriptless settlements rather pointless." According to one commmentator:
"Before a meeting is held, CCASS seeks instructions from its participants
and aggregates all the votes, then forwards them to the company by filling
in a proxy form. Often they will send someone to actually attend the
108 See David Webb, "The Practitioner's Guide to Listing Rule Loopholes", available at http://www.
webb-site.com/loopholes.htm#ConnectedT.
109 Companies Ordinance, First Sch, Table A, Art 60.
110 Webb (n 108 above).
I bid. Often through their bank, broker or custodian, as that is how they received the shares when
they bought them, and they have to be in the system to settle a sale. But since May 1998, it has also
been possible to hold stock directly in the CCASS system as an "investor participant". The fees are
lower than most brokers will charge and there is no risk of the broker running away with the stock.
112 Ibid.
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meeting, but that person can only cast one vote on a show of hands, so
they make a single vote based on the majority of instructions received.""'
Thus, unless there is a poll where each share has one vote, the CCASS, who
represents the public, is in the minority. The shareholders' right to demand a
poll is provided for in the articles of association. Typically, the articles pro-
vide that a poll can be demanded: (a) by the chairman; or (b) by at least two
members present in person or by proxy; or (c) by any member or members
present in person or by proxy and representing not less than one-tenth of the
total voting rights of all the members having the right to vote at the meeting;
or (d) by a member or members holding one-tenth of the paid-up capital
conferring a right to vote."I
Section 114D of the Companies Ordinance, which is similar to section
373 of the English Companies Act 1985, provides that any provision con-
tained in a company's article is void in so far as it would:
1 exclude the right to demand a poll at a general meeting on any ques-
tion other than the election of the chairman of the meeting or the
adjournment of the meeting; or
2 require more persons to demand a poll on any such question than:
(a) five members having the right to vote at the meeting; or
(b)a member or members representing not less than one-tenth of the
total voting rights of all the members having the right to vote at the
meeting; or
(c) a member or members holding one-tenth of the paid up capital con-
ferring a right to vote.
Furthermore, a proxy has the same right as the members he represents to
demand a poll."'
If a poll is demanded, CCASS will have more than one vote, and need
not use all the votes or cast all the votes it uses in the same way." 6 This will
enable the CCASS to cast votes in a manner which reflects the respective
interests of the various shareholders participating in the system. However,
CCASS usually does not demand a poll, even if it has received voting
113 Ibid. The SFC is currently studying the problems to which share ownership under CCASS gives rise
and plans to introduce legislative changes after public consultation to deal with the problems, See
Yeung (n 89 above).
11 Companies Ordinance, First Sch, Table A, Art 60.
11' Ibid., s 114D(2).
116 Ibid., s 114E.
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instructions in respect of shares totalling more than 10 per cent of the
votes."17 As one author has noted:
"You would have to make a special arrangement to get CCASS to demand
a poll, in respect of your shareholding alone, which would have to be
pretty big unless at least two other shareholders at the meeting go with
CCASS.""'
It has been suggested that one simple solution is for the Listing Rules to re-
quire that all votes in meetings of shareholders be held on a poll."' As one
commentator argued, "[mleetings would take longer, but be far fairer, as votes
sent through CCASS would be given their full voting weight based on shares
held and not hands raised. As a consequence, controlling shareholders would
think harder before trying to rip off minorities."z 0 The HKEx has proposed
to amend the Listing Rules to require voting by poll for connected transac-
tions and all resolutions requiring independent shareholders' approval."' It
has also been suggested that CCASS should be required to use its votes in a
manner which reflects the instructions from its participants.'
2 Absence of Class Action and Contingency Fee
As mentioned, the obscurity of the common law on derivative action coupled
with the high cost of litigation in Hong Kong has prevented shareholders
from being more actively involved in holding controlling shareholders ac-
countable for any wrongdoing. It has sometimes been suggested that as a way
of encouraging and assisting legal action by shareholders, Hong Kong should
adopt the US style class action and contingency fee system.2" A class action
in the US is essentially a personal action brought by shareholders as a group
(or in other words, an action by shareholders as a group for harms to their
interests directly as owners of the shares).12 4 The current procedure in Hong
Kong is not designed to cater for group litigation. Shareholders in Hong Kong




121 HKEx Consultation Paper (n 29 above), Part B, paras 1.1-1.6.
122 Webb (n 108 above).
123 The Chairman of the SFC, Mr Andrew Sheng, has reportedly said that the absence of a US-style
class action contingency fee system was another weakness of Hong Kong's corporate governance: see
Yeung (n 49 above). Mr David Webb, a shareholder activist in Hong Kong, has called for the intro-
duction of the US system: see Yeung (n 89 above).
124 See Arthur R. Pinto, "The United States", in Arthur R. Pinto and Gustavo Visentini (eds), The
Legal Basis of Corporate Governance in Publicly Held Corporations: A Comparative Approach (The
Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p 275.
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can bring representative action to enforce shareholders' personal rights, but
it is only suitable for a relatively small number of parties closely concerned in
the same proceedings, and inadequate for dealing with large-scale multi-party
situations."' The Chief Justice's Working Party is currently considering
whether a group litigation scheme should be adopted.1 6
Apart from the inadequacy of representative action as a main way of fa-
cilitating group shareholder litigation, representative action is rarely used
because, as discussed above, it appears that expropriation cannot be a subject
of a personal action. Thus, until the law is reformed to allow personal action
to redress a wrong done to the company and breach of directors' duties, the
introduction of a group litigation scheme or class action would not help.
As for the contingency fee system in the United States, it is well known
that plaintiffs in a civil action pay their own legal fees regardless of the outcome,
but in a class action, attorneys' fees can come from the class if there is a
judgment or settlement."I However, attorneys can be paid on a contingency
basis, that is plaintiffs can bring an action without paying fees if the attorney
is willing to bet on a recovery. There are attorneys who specialise in such
suits who are willing to fund the class action and this has helped many share-
holders to bring class actions against the wrongdoing directors or managers.
We do not have a contingency fee system in Hong Kong. The debate as to
whether we should have one has been around for a long time and is ongoing.
In the United States, while the contingency fee system has made it possible
for attorneys who are willing to fund the litigation to help solve the collec-
tive action problem, it has also encouraged attorneys to bring "strike suits"
only for the fees." In some instances, attorneys have been able to control
the litigation by forcing settlements with small recoveries and large fees from
the corporation and avoiding the burdens and costs of litigation with exten-
sive discovery."'
3 Access to Information
To a large extent, the shareholders' ability to monitor by legal action the
management against expropriation or other wrongdoing depends on whether
they have sufficient information about the transactions complained of.
125 See n 95 above, a 385.
126 Ibid., p 18 (s 77 of the executive summary), and ss 391-402 of the main text.
127 Pinto (n 124 above), p 276.
128 Ibid., p 276.
129 Ibid., p 276; Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, "The Plaintiffs Attorneys' Role in Class Actions
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform" (1991) 58 U Chi
L Rev 1.
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Currently, while they have rights of access to certain information, 13 0 the
company's accounts, books or papers can be inspected only if authorised by
directors or a general meeting. It is the lack of access to books and accounts
that disadvantages the shareholders.
This list of information available to shareholders is relatively short in com-
parison with the standards applied not only in the United States, but also in
Continental Europe. In particular, minority shareholders are usually inter-
ested in the financial rights of directors; therefore, shareholders can seek
information concerning the salaries, fees and bonus payments paid to direc-
tors as, for example, in France131 and Luxembourg.' 32 The shareholders,
however, do not have direct access to the books, but the management is obliged
to disclose appropriate information.
It is important to strike a balance between empowering minority share-
holders and preventing harassment of the company by certain shareholders.
Thus, the SCCLR proposes that shareholders should have access to informa-
tion by application to the court."' They must satisfy the court that they are
acting in good faith and inspection is for a proper purpose. Only authorised
persons (eg solicitors and auditors) can inspect and make copies of docu-
ments inspected under court order, and they must not disclose information
obtained except to relevant authorities (eg the court). This appears to be a
very sensible proposal which will strengthen the shareholders' monitoring
power on the one hand and protect business confidentiality on the other.
The HKICS is also in favour of this proposal.
4 Fiduciary Duties and the Duty of Care and Skill
Currently, directors owe fiduciary duties to the company to act in the best in-
terest of the company, and not to profit from their position as directors, nor
place themselves in a position where their duties to the company may conflict
with their personal interest. They should not exercise their powers for improper
purposes, nor fetter the exercise of their powers. They must also exercise care
130 For example, to inspect the register of debenture holders (Companies Ordinance, s 74A), register of
charges (ibid., s 83), register of directors and secretaries (ibid., s 158(7)), minute books of general
meeting (ibid., s 120), register of members (ibid., s 95) and management contracts at general meet-
ings (ibid., s 162A) and to ask for a copy of the memorandum and articles (ibid., s 26). Profit and loss
statement, balance sheet and auditor's report are sent to members before the general meeting (ibid.,
s 129G). The register of interests in shares is open to inspection by the public (Securities (Disclosure
of Interests) Ordinance, s 27).
131 See L225-177 to L225-187-1, s 5 of the French Company Law; T. Jacomet and H. Naciri, "France",
in Maitland-Waller (n 31 above), pp 193-205.
132 See P. Schleimer, "Luxembourg", in AIJA (n 61 above), pp 137-144.
1' SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), para 18.05.
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and skill in the discharge of their duties to the company. There is no statutory
formulation of the business judgment rule in Hong Kong, although the court
will not question the business judgment of the directors and will not interfere
with the directors' decision if there is no evidence of bad faith.
To cause the company to enter into expropriation transactions in favour
of directors themselves or the controlling shareholders is potentially a breach
of directors' duties. However, as directors' fiduciary duties and duty of care
and skill have been developed over a century entirely by judges on a case-by-
case basis, a process of judicial decisions setting precedents and applying or
distinguishing them in various circumstances, there are inevitably uncertain-
ties and sometimes inconsistencies. For example, how do we decide whether
the directors have exercised their power for a proper purpose in a particular
situation?34 When can directors profit from their position?"' If the director
enters into a transaction with the company, can the transaction be ratified by
the general meeting?"' As mentioned above, the common law rule prohibit-
ing directors from entering into contracts with the company is now of course
subject to section 162 of the Companies Ordinance which allows directors to
enter into such contracts if proper disclosure of interest has been made and
approval of the board of directors has been obtained. This makes it possible
for directors who are also controlling shareholders to abuse their power. On
the other hand, the common law duty of care and skill is often applied with
difficulty. When will a director be held negligent, since the level of care and
skill to be expected varies with the ability, experience and qualification of
the director?"' When can he delegate certain tasks and duties to others?"' It
is not entirely satisfactory if directors do not know what exactly is expected of
them and how to behave. Research has shown that many directors do not
134 See for example Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [19741 AC 821, PC (allotment of shares to
enable takeovers), Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd 11967] Ch 254 (allotment of shares to prevent takeovers)
where power was held to have been improperly exercised. Contrast Teck Corporation v Millar (1972)
33 DLR (3d) 288, British Columbia and Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150, Australia where manipu-
lation of voting power through allotment of shares was held valid.
135 See for example Regal (Hastings) Ltd (n 19 above) (directors joined in transaction so that company
could have the contract, held accountable); Cook v Deeks (n 23 above) (formed new company to
take contract from third party, held accountable); Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley
[1972] 1 WLR 443 (resigned to take contract from third party, held accountable). Contrast Island
Export Finance Ltd v Umunna [1986] BCLC 460 (resigned because of personal reasons, then took
contract from third party, held valid); Kishimoto Sangyo Co. Ltd v Oba [19961 2 HKC 260 (Oba
resigned and then pursued the possibility of supplying the same equipment for the mass production
contract for which he was negotiating for the company before his resignation: held no breach of
fiduciary duty as the mass production contract was not a maturing business opportunity),
136 See for example Regal (Hastings) Ltd (n 19 above) (obiter: directors could have ratified the transac-
tion as shareholders); Cook v Deeks (n 23 above) (ratification by majority as shareholders was not
valid).
17 See the test in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd [1925] Ch 407.
138 Ibid. Contrast the more demanding test in Daniels v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607, NSW CA.
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know what duties they owe in law to the company."' And many lawyers find
it difficult to advise their clients whether certain proposed conduct or trans-
actions may be a breach of directors' duties. Thus, there has been a debate in
the United Kingdom and Hong Kong as to whether there should be a clear
statutory statement of duties so that directors know their position.
Surprisingly, the SCCLR in the consultation paper is of the view that the
current law on fiduciary duties and standards of care and skill is generally
acceptable and that there is no need to have a statutory statement of duties.
We find this difficult to understand. The courts in the United Kingdom and
Hong Kong have for many years struggled with the difficulties that arose from
case law on directors' duties which in the United Kingdom had prompted the
question of codification to be considered twice. The state of the case law is
anything but acceptable. Although the SCCLR points out in the consulta-
tion paper that the Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) in the
United Kingdom has proposed a statutory restatement, and that there is gen-
eral support for it, it did not think that such a restatement would work in
Hong Kong. It points out that it would not be possible for all duties to be
properly encapsulated in the law where the breach depends on the complexi-
ties of the facts.o And such a statement would be regarded as exhaustive.
This argument is true only if full codification is adopted. If partial codifica-
tion is adopted, whereby the statute would provide the main, settled duties,
while the general law would continue to apply in those areas not covered by
statute, the statutory statement would not be exhaustive, and the law would
continue to develop.'4 1
In contrast, the UK Law Commission and CLRSG have seen the benefits
of partial codification of duties. 4 1 First, it will provide greater clarity to what
is expected of directors and make the law more accessible. This will in turn
help to improve standards of governance. Second, it will enable defects in
the present law to be corrected where it no longer corresponds to accepted
norms of modern business practice. Third, it addresses the question of "scope",
ie in whose interests should companies be run? The parliamentary draftsmen
in the United Kingdom have also supported such a move by confirming that
such a statement can be effectively drafted in an accessible form which is also
fit for the statute book.
139 Abdual Majid, Low Chee Keong and Krishnan Arjunan, "Company Directors' Perceptions of their
Responsibilities and Duties: Hong Kong Survey" (1998) 28 HKLJ 60.
140 SCCLR Consultation Paper (n 12 above), para 6.13.
141 See for example the arguments in Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors:
Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law Com No 261) (London:
Stationery Office, 1999) paras 4.4-4.9, 4.22, 4.31-4.43.
142 Ibid., Part IV; The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive
Economy: Final Report (July 2001), paras 1.21-1.22, 1.54, 2.20, 3.5-3.11.
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Conclusion
Controlling shareholders and the problems associated with them are signi-
ficant features of Hong Kong's financial markets and are unlikely to change
in the short term. Some people have suggested increasing the requirement
for minimum public floats (currently 25 per cent of shares) in listed com-
panies as a way of reducing the prevalence of controlling shareholders. "4
The authors respectfully disagree, as this effectively requires the controlling
shareholders to give up more of their share of wealth in a listed company in
return for the privilege of listing."' This can be seen as a reverse expropria-
tion by the public. As explained in this article, there are other ways of dealing
with the problems of dominant shareholding. What is needed is tighter
control, as proposed by the SCCLR's and HKEx's consultation papers, both
of which are broadly in line with international standards and the laws of
many European countries. Simple reform of the process of voting, the process
of nomination and appointment of directors, of related party transactions as
well as a clearer scope of directors' duties, improvement of legal remedies and
access to company books would all help to prevent unfair expropriation and
enhance Hong Kong's standards of corporate governance.
143 Low Chee Keong, Hong Kong Lawyer, Apr 2000, p 3 2 suggests that the minimum free float should
initially be lifted to at least 30% with a higher free float of 50% for smaller capitalised companies
and that this distinction he gradually phased out with a free float of 50% ultimately being common
for all companies.
44 Minimum free floating requirements are usually not stated in European laws; however, there is a
possibility for a large controlling shareholder to place a request with the stock exchange to delist the
shares if regular trading no longer takes place.
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